



It is eminently appropriate that the Inaugural Lecture of the
Brennan Center Symposium on Constitutional Law be delivered by
Frank Michelman, for no one could be more deserving or more enlight-
ening. It is also appropriate that Michelman should choose as his topic
the tension between democracy and constitutionalism, for this tension
has been the central problem of American constitutional theory since
the onset of the twentieth century.
Constitutional theory is an odd enterprise. In contrast to certain
political philosophies that aspire to systematic analysis based on first
principles, constitutional theory primarily seeks to expose and clarify
the principles immanent within the practice of constitutional adjudica-
tion. For this reason constitutional theory cannot posit itself behind a
"veil of ignorance... or within an "ideal speech situation."2 Constitu-
tional theory is always, so to speak, within our tradition and our history;
it is parasitic on the very practice it seeks to explain. The achievements
of revered and influential Justices, like William J. Brennan, whom we are
here justly convened to honor, must therefore be taken as part of the
data to be explained. In this sense, Michelman is right to place
Brennan's work at the center of his investigation.
I
It is, however, a tricky business to expose and clarify the principles
immanent within a practice. This is because sophisticated practices, like
constitutional adjudication, tend to be complex and filled with unre-
solved internal tensions that leave ample room for critical disagree-
ments.3 Indeed, as Alasdair MacIntyre has written, "A living
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tradition ... is an historically extended, socially embodied argument,
and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that
tradition. 4 To pursue constitutional theory is not (as a general matter)
to transcend or settle such arguments, but to engage them with a theo-
retical clarity, range, and abstraction that will hopefully prove useful to
those who perform or wish to understand the actual work of constitu-
tional adjudication.
The tension between constitutionalism and democracy identified by
Michelman is a classic example of a central, ongoing argument within
the practice of constitutional adjudication. Michelman accurately identi-
fies "constitutionalism" as involving "a 'law of lawmaking' ... that
controls which further laws can be made and by what procedures."5 He
also convincingly identifies "democracy" with the idea of "[p]opular
political self-government-the people of a country deciding for them-
selves the contents of the laws that organize and regulate their political
association."6 American constitutional theory has struggled throughout
this century to reconcile constitutionalism with democracy.
The parameters of any such reconciliation must be set by paradig-
matic instances of actual constitutional adjudication, which form the ba-
sis upon which theoretical argumentation can proceed. From this
perspective, however, there seems to be something strange about the way
in which Michelman has formulated the issue. Michelman refers to a
"necessity" that underlies the "irrepressible impulse to hive off
fundamental-law determinations from the procedural purview of de-
mocracy" and that even "entirely bars democracy from a decision-
space where it would seem urgently and rightly to want to go, that of
deciding the contents of a country's most basic laws, its laws of law-
making."7 Yet within the practice of constitutional adjudication there
are obviously paradigmatic instances, left unexplained by this conclu-
sion, that subordinate constitutional meaning to the peremptory and
even arbitrary direction of popular will.
Imagine, for example, that an amendment to the United States Con-
stitution were to be properly and duly proposed by two-thirds of both
houses of Congress, and properly and duly ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the States. Imagine that the amendment repeals the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment and unambiguously provides that no one
who is not yet 21 years of age can vote for any federal official.'
4. ALASDAIR MACINTYPR, AFTER VmTUE 207 (1981).
5. Frank Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CALIF. L REV. 399, 400 (1998).
6. Id. at 430.
7. Id. at 420.
8. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of age."
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Suppose, finally, that a citizen of the United States who is eighteen years
of age and who wishes to vote in an upcoming Presidential election
brings suit in federal court for the right to vote.
I take this to be a paradigmatically easy case,9 meaning that any
judge who would decide for the plaintiff could be said not quite to un-
derstand the practice of constitutional adjudication. This would be true
regardless of the judge's personal beliefs, political philosophy or con-
stitutional convictions. The judge might even consider the new constitu-
tional amendment to be wrong-headed and anti-democratic. But she
would nevertheless rule against the plaintiff on the ground that the new
amendment reflects the popular will of the people as measured by the
procedural standards of Article V, and that the amendment is therefore
properly enforceable as constitutional law. In such a case, popular sov-
ereignty manifestly trumps constitutionalism.
Of course I have in my example loaded the dice by postulating a
recent and unambiguous constitutional amendment."0 The kinds of cases
that concern Michelman, and that have concerned most constitutional
theorists, are in fact quite different. They tend to involve old constitu-
tional provisions with general and equivocal language, like "cruel and
unusual punishments," "the equal protection of the laws," "due proc-
ess of law," or "the freedom of speech." Michelman is correct to con-
clude that our history of constitutional adjudication renders it genuinely
implausible to regard the interpretation and application of such consti-
tutional provisions as carrying the authority of popular will, even
though these provisions were once popularly enacted." So long as these
provisions continue to provide grounds for invalidating expressions of
popular will manifested in ordinary legislation, the tension identified by
Michelman between constitutionalism and democracy does indeed rise
insolubly to the fore.
II
At the conclusion of his paper, Michelman proffers a "surmise"
about how Brennan himself might resolve this tension. The surmise rests
on the assertion that democracy need not entail the requirement that
persons make (or participate in making) the laws by which they are
governed. Instead it is said that a person who willingly abides by the
laws "'out of respect' for them, because she finds on reflection that
9. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985).
10. I have loaded the dice in other ways as well. The example postulates an amendment that,
while itself an interpretation of democratic principles, is not in flagrant and radical contradiction to
fundamental and generally accepted democratic principles. Imagine by contrast a clear constitutional
amendment that authorizes life tenure for the President. Such an amendment would expose the
tension between democracy and popular sovereignty that I discuss infra at Part V.
11. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 415.
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they are just, or fair," is "in a state of self-government, in as full a sense
as we can reasonably hope to find in politics."'2 It is not clear whether
Michelman himself accepts this position; he maintains a judicious dis-
cretion on the question, although there is some textual evidence that
Michelman is not ultimately satisfied with it. In my view, however, the
position ought to be definitively repudiated.
The position rests on the claim that there exist "procedure-
independent standards of rightness," so that respect for constitutional
judgments cannot depend purely on procedure-dependent criteria that
measure the popular will, 3 like the standards of Article V that would
validate the constitutional amendment I imagined in the previous sec-
tion. Instead,
the attributes in a set of fundamental laws that would command
your respect would be as follows: First, it would have to appear
to you that a maximum feasible effort is constantly being made
to get the fundamental laws right. This ... includes getting their
major interpretations right. Quite conceivably, this maximum
feasible effort could.., include provision for a tribunal whose
special business and concern it is to decide the interprettions.
Second, this maximum feasible effort to get the fundamental
laws right would have to include arrangements for exposing the
empowered fundamental-law deciders to the full blast of sundry
opinions and interest-articulations in society, including every-
one's opinions and articulations of interests. Note that what now
matters to you about having your own opinions and interest-
articulations registered is not some bit of leverage you exercise
over what gets decided, but rather the presumptive epistemic
value of your contributions to the debate ....
Suppose you hold the. . . belief that the preceding two
conditions for the production of fundamental laws (and their
interpretations) are currently satisfied. You, then, can abide by
the fundamental laws (including major interpretations) willingly,
out of respect for them. Are you not then freely governing
yourself, at least so far as politics are concerned? 4
Michelman believes that if a Justice like Brennan were to attempt to rec-
oncile his work of constitutional interpretation with democratic self-
governance, he would have to accept these two structural conditions.
Merely for the sake of terminological convenience, I shall call these
conditions "Michelman's model."
One premise of Michelman's model is that a Justice's judgments
are generally accepted as "just, or fair," or "right." We need to
12. Id. at 424.
13. Id. at 424-25.
14. Id. at 425-26.
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inquire, however, how the model will function with respect to those who
do not accept this premise. The point is important, because it raises a
central problem of collective self-government that goes back at least to
Rousseau. 5 The problem revolves around the question of how, in the
face of manifest and indissoluble differences, we may be said to govern
ourselves through collective self-determination. Why is every majori-
tarian enactment not also an act of oppression against a minority? Or, to
put the same question another way, how is the agent of collective self-
determination to be constructed?
In response to this problem, Rousseau postulated that the particular
will of each and every citizen should be fused with the general will of
all, so that, in obeying the general will, each "obeys no one but himself,
and remains as free as before."'" By assuming that a Justice's judg-
ments are accepted as "just, or fair," or "right," Michelman essentially
postulates the same fusion of particular and general wills as did Rous-
seau. If we agree that a great Justice like Brennan has correctly inter-
preted our fundamental law, then our particular will is, in fact, in
conformity with the general will as enacted in Brennan's judgments. To
obey these judgments is thus to obey ourselves, so that, as Michelman
accurately observes, we can be said to be "in a state of self-government,
in as full a sense as we can reasonably hope to find in politics."'7
But many have charged Rousseau with willful unreality in postu-
lating a determinate fusion between the particular wills of individual
citizens and the general will of the state. Michelman's model is appro-
priately subject to the same critique. For however great Justice Brennan
may be, and I am prepared to go very far on this score," it still remains
true that his work is controversial and that it is not accepted as "just" or
"right" by large segments of the population. The same would be true
of the work of any Justice. This is a consequence of what John Rawls
has called the wide "diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable-and
what's more, reasonable-comprehensive doctrines"'9 that characterizes
modem societies.
The question, then, is how the tension between constitutionalism
and democracy may be reconciled with respect to the many persons
who do not share a Justice's judgments about our fundamental law. Al-
though agreement with particular constitutional interpretations may il-
luminate how specific individuals can come to identify with
15. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin
Books 1968) (1762).
16. Id. at 60.
17. Michelman, supra note 5, at 424.
18. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, 8 CONST.
COMMENT. 11 (1991).
19. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1993).
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constitutional judgments, it can not explain how a diverse nation can
come to do so.
I
Michelman's model seems to intimate a response to this problem
that moves slightly in the direction adopted by some modem critics of
Rousseau. Finding it implausible to postulate that the particular wills of
individuals can be determinably identified with the specific enactments
of the state, these critics have suggested that democratic self-government
requires that the particular wills of individuals be connected instead to
the system by which these enactments are created. They have thus pro-
posed that law making be rendered dependent upon public opinion, and
they have postulated that a necessary condition for citizens to identify
with public opinion is the guarantee that all can freely participate in the
public deliberations by which public opinion is formed." Such demo-
cratic participation allows for the emergence of a collective "agent"
that can engage in the process of self-determination.
Michelman's model hints at a system that is very different, and yet
that also aims to assure democratic self-determination even in the ab-
sence of agreement about the content of specific laws. Michelman speci-
fies two conditions for this system: (1) the existence of a tribunal
"whose special business and concern it is to decide the interpretations,"
and (2) a set of arrangements for exposing members of this tribunal to
"the full blast of sundry opinions and interest-articulations in soci-
ety."21 Whereas the system advanced by those who locate democratic
self-governance in the creation of public opinion stresses the potential
participation of citizens in the formation of the laws by which they are
to be governed, Michelman's model explicitly excludes this notion of
participation. The precise question, therefore, is whether the structure
proposed by Michelman can be said to reconcile constitutionalism with
democracy in the absence of agreement as to the outcomes of particular
constitutional judgments.
Michelman's model is actually quite analogous to the adversary
system, at least as that system has been interpreted by scholars like Lon
Fuller.' The adversary system also contains a tribunal dedicated to the
proper interpretation and application of the law, and it also sponsors
advocates who have the epistemic function of ensuring that before a
court reaches judgment "each side of the controversy be carefully
20. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 184-87 (1995).
21. Michelman, supra note 5, at 425.
22. See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30-43 (Harold
Joseph Berman ed., 1961).
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considered and be given its full weight and value."' We might willingly
concede that these conditions roughly establish the legitimacy of judg-
ments reached through the adversary system, as partisans like Fuller evi-
dently believe that they do; indeed, Michelman does sometimes speak as
if he were addressing "the problem of political legitimacy." 4
But no one with whom I am familiar, and certainly not Fuller, has
gone so far as to claim that these conditions suffice to justify character-
izing the adversary system as a structure of democratic self-governance.
While we often refer to the parties to a lawsuit as subject to a court's ju-
risdiction, we do not say that they govern themselves through the exer-
cise of a court's jurisdiction. Or, if we were in special circumstances
inclined to press such an odd claim, we would undoubtedly support it
by reference to the fact that the parties, in their capacities as citizens,
have participated in the formation of the very laws applied by the court.
But it is precisely this latter consideration that Michelman's model
wishes to exclude.
If adversary litigation most precisely fulfills the structural condi-
tions advanced by Michelman, and if the parties to such litigation can-
not be said to govern themselves through the pronouncements of a
court, then neither can the entire population of the country be said to
govern itself through the constitutional interpretations of the Supreme
Court. That is why opposition to the Court's constitutional jurispru-
dence almost always has taken the form of attacking the Court's judg-
ments as anti-democratic. During the 1920s, for example, when the Taft
Court was vigorously resurrecting substantive due process, those who
disagreed with the Court's constitutional interpretations did not view the
Court as an instrument of self-governance, but instead attacked it as an
"Unreformed House of Lords, '" 5 an "absolute despotism '26 that
"militates against every conception upon which democratic govern-
ments are supposed to be based."'2
If these characterizations seem exaggerated, imagine a contempo-
rary Court staffed by Justices who, though competent, dedicated, and
subject to "the full blast of sundry opinions and interest-articulations in
society," nevertheless persist in pursuing a jurisprudence deeply at odds
with your own. Imagine a Court of nine Justices McReynolds. I very
much doubt that you would regard such a Court as an instrument of
self-governance, despite the fulfillment of the two structural conditions
proposed by Michelman.
23. Id. at31.
24. Michelman, supra note 5, at 424.
25. Supreme Court Nullifies People's Will, THE N.Y. CALL, June 16, 1922, at 1.
26. Justice Ford Backs La Follette Ticket, N.Y. Trms, Aug. 31, 1924, at 1.
27. Meyer London, The Veto Power of the Supreme Court, in ANL FEDERATIONIST, Mar. 1923,
at 225.
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This suggests that Michelman's model fundamentally, depends
upon the Court getting its major interpretations right. When we do not
believe that the Court has correctly interpreted the Constitution,
Michelman's two additional structural conditions are themselves inca-
pable of generating the value of democratic self-determination. At most,
these conditions can establish only political legitimacy.
IV
Michelman is certainly correct to flag the problem of how "getting
it right" relates to the achievement of democratic self-governance. Even
if a state were to subordinate lawmaking to public opinion, and even if
all citizens were free to participate in the formation of public opinion, a
particular group within the state that found itself perpetually outvoted,
ignored, and alienated might well question whether the state were an ap-
propriate vehicle for democratic self-governance. The group might even
consider seceding from the state and founding its own democratic pol-
ity. This illustrates that a system of free and open democratic participa-
tion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democratic self-
governance. Persistent and fundamental disagreement with other citizens
may preclude the identification with the state that a system of open
democratic participation is precisely established to promote.
It is important, however, to specify exactly how the fact of social
disagreement intersects with the creation of democratic legitimacy. If
democratic self-government requires that citizens identify with a system
of open participation in the formation of public opinion, democratic
legitimacy is correspondingly rendered independent of the particular
legislative outcomes of that system. This independence allows demo-
cratic legitimacy to fit more or less comfortably with the "irreparable
reasonable disagreement" that characterizes modem heterogeneous
states." Persistent and fundamental disagreement constitutes a limiting
condition of this independence; it identifies the extreme point at which
democracy and diversity may become impossible to reconcile.
The fact of social disagreement plays an entirely different theoreti-
cal role within Michelman's model. This is because citizens in that
model can be said to be governing themselves only to the extent that
they agree with the constitutional judgments of the Court. Consensus
defines and exhausts the scope of democratic self-governance. Disa-
greement therefore negates democratic legitimacy not only in extreme
circumstances, but in all circumstances. Michelman's model offers no
way to bridge the chasm between democratic legitimacy and the
"irreparable reasonable disagreement" of modern society. This is a
28. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 35.
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powerful reason for rejecting Michelman's model as a convincing ac-
count of the general enterprise of democratic self-governance within
contemporary states.
This enterprise, however, is not the focus of Michelman's project.
He develops his model within the much narrower context of attempting
to reconcile democracy with constitutionalism, as constitutionalism is
embodied in the institution of judicial review. He wishes to explore this
tension under the harsh (and I think accurate) assumption that much
constitutional interpretation cannot plausibly be interpreted as reflecting
public opinion, so that our general system of democratic participation
cannot confer democratic legitimacy on one constitutional judgment or
another. What remains to be considered, therefore, is how the
"surmise" Michelman attributes to Brennan fares within this far more
limited context.
V
Constitutionalism, at least in the United States, entails the institution
of judicial review, in which courts determine whether to strike down oth-
erwise perfectly legitimate enactments that are presumed to reflect the
popular will. Sometimes, as in our First Amendment jurisprudence, these
enactments are invalidated on the ground that they are inconsistent with
a freedom of expression that is deemed "vital to the maintenance of our
democratic institutions."" In such circumstances the First Amendment
is characterized as "the guardian of our democracy."30 This strongly
implies that within our constitutional tradition democracy can not be
equated with majoritarian expressions of popular will.
Constitutional theory, therefore, must distinguish between democ-
racy and something that we might (stipulatively) call popular sover-
eignty. We can define popular sovereignty as the subordination of the
state to the popular will, as that will is recognized by such procedural
criteria as majoritarianism or the amendment mechanism of Article V.
The hypothetical constitutional amendment that I imagined at the be-
ginning of this comment should be viewed as an example of popular
sovereignty, not necessarily of democracy. Particular expressions of the
popular will may or may not be consistent with the requirements of
democratic self-governance. If the people were duly to enact a constitu-
tional amendment that abolishes the vote and awards lifetime and he-
reditary tenure to federal officials, the amendment would exemplify
popular sovereignty, but it would nevertheless be manifestly anti-
democratic.
29. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
30. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982).
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This is because popular sovereignty is defined by reference to pro-
cedural criteria, whereas democracy is defined by reference to substan-
tive values. As Michelman forcefully and correctly argues, "Democracy
is a demanding normative idea, an idea with content,
however uncertain or disputable that content may be."31 I have argued
elsewhere that within our constitutional tradition, democracy is prized
because of the value of collective self-governance, a value with powerful
and contestable implications. 2 These implications include, for example,
an uncensored and perennially open-ended structure of public dis-
course that presumes participation by autonomous citizens.3 Courts
have used the First Amendment to set aside majoritarian enactments that
contradict these implications of the substantive value of democracy. In
such circumstances, the tension which constitutional theory has con-
ceptualized as between democracy and constitutionalism can be ana-
lyzed more accurately as a conflict between popular sovereignty and the
constitutional ideal of democracy.
The question that Michelman wishes forthrightly and acutely to
explore is the nature of a court's authority in striking down majoritarian
enactments. Michelman is surely right to argue that public opinion does
not authorize the many particular interpretations of the substantive val-
ues of democracy that courts must make in order to evaluate the myriad
of unforeseen circumstances that come before them. And he is surely
right to press the more fundamental claim that democracy cannot
"decide the question of what democracy means in the first place. '
Michelman thus forces us to inquire whether constitutional judgments
applying the substantive values of democracy can be rendered consis-
tent with the self-governance required by democracy.
Michelman's model offers a cogent response to this query: Such
constitutional judgments are democratic to the extent, and only to the
extent, that we believe the Court has reached the right decision, because
in such circumstances we will be bound by laws with which we agree.
But (to appropriate Michelman's phrase) the "dark-hued message" of
this position is that under conditions of "irreparable reasonable disa-
greement," constitutional adjudication applying the values of democ-
racy will necessarily remain unreconciled with the practice of self-
governance for large patches of the population. If we are precluded
31. Michelman, supra note 5, at 419.
32. See POST, supra note 20, at 184-91.
33. See id at 186-91, 272-86. The procedural account of democracy that Michelman attributes
to me seems roughly to express merely one implication of the substantive idea of democracy for the
regulation of public discourse. See id. at 277-78. For a more robust account of the implications of the
substantive value of democracy, see Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1249, 1263-64 (1997).
34. Michelnan, supra note 5, at 419.
[Vol. 86:429
HeinOnline -- 86 Cal. L. Rev. 438 1998
DEMOCRACY
from participating in the formation of the law by which we are gov-
erned, and if we do not otherwise identify with that law, it cannot be at-
tributed to us as our own democratic creation. As Michelman writes,
"To find the laws deserving of your respect is not yet to decide the
laws."35
VI
This does not mean, however, that constitutional interpretations of
the value of democracy lack legitimacy, because there are many sources
of legitimacy other than democratic self-determination. Indeed, as I
have argued elsewhere, the practice of democracy is always embedded
within and presupposes the continued flourishing of nondemocratic
forms of social organization.36 Our ongoing commitment to the value of
collective self-determination must itself depend upon processes of so-
cialization and cultural reproduction that are both nondemocratic and
characteristic of the kind of social ordering that I have called
"community."37
Democracy orients toward the future; it concerns a people's power
to decide their own fate, and it thus requires a social structure that con-
tinuously preserves the potential for remaking individual and collective
identity. Community, in contrast, is retrospective; it entails a social
structure that seeks to articulate and enforce social norms, which are
presumed to be already constitutive of both individual and collective
identity.38 Yet the open-ended future envisioned by democracy always
presupposes an ongoing commitment to at least one pre-existing value,
that of democracy itself. For that reason, democracy depends upon a
social structure that sustains and nourishes the value of collective self-
determination as constitutive of collective and individual identity.39
The value of collective self-determination is therefore a community
norm. Like all community norms, it is reproduced by means of sociali-
zation and institutionalization. And, like all community norms, it is in-
trinsically contestable.' We inevitably differ about the meaning of the
value of democracy, because to take a position about that meaning is to
express a vision about who we are as a people. As a consequence, the
35. Id. at 427.
36. See PosT, supra note 20, at 192-93.
37. See id at 13-15, 188-96.
38. See id at 52-59, 180-91.
39. This leads to what I have elsewhere called the "paradox of public discourse' In our
constitutional tradition, democracy has been interpreted to suspend the enforcement within public
discourse of the very community norms that sustain the practice and ongoing commitment of our
culture to democracy. See id. at 13-14, 146-48.
40. See UL at 183; Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 Amz. ST. I. 473,
476 (1997).
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boundary between democracy and popular sovereignty is always debat-
able. One of the most striking contributions of Michelman's essay is its
dogged illumination of the paradoxical ways in which the ideal of
democratic self-governance requires both popular sovereignty and
limitations on that sovereignty. Ultimately, however, these limitations
can have no greater warrant than our best "effort to read the
Constitution in the light of what John Dewey once called 'The Great
Community' of the nation."41
Of course this analysis is not confined to the First Amendment and
the value of democracy. Not only is the practice of constitutional inter-
pretation not itself grounded in democratic self-determination, but the
specific value of democratic self-determination is only one of many
values that constitutional interpretation seeks to promote. These values
range from those of federalism (associated with the text of the Eleventh
Amendment), to those of substantive, equality (implied by the Equal
Protection Clause), to those of fairness (as embodied in the Due Process
Clause), to those of liberal humanitarianism (typically located in the text
of the Eighth Amendment). Most instances of lively constitutional adju-
dication involve the effort to peer "behind the words of the constitu-
tional provisions" to discern the "postulates which limit and control."42
These postulates ultimately root themselves in "constitutional ideals,"43
which is to say, in interpretations of the historically fundamental norms
of the national community. Taken together, these ideals comprise what
may be called a national ethos."
Judicial exposition of the national ethos flourishes in the interstices
of popular sovereignty. Constitutional interpretation is always subject to
revision by the arbitrary will of the people as measured by the proce-
dure-dependent standards of Article V. These standards function as a
rule of recognition that transforms popular opinion into positive law.
The brute dictates of that law stand forth as naked and compelling. But
as the immediate context of that law fades with time, and as unforeseen
41. PosT, supra note 20, at 18; see also id at 23-50; Post, supra note 40, at 482-83.
42. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
43. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
44. See PosT, supra note 20, at 35-38, 41-49. Various ideals within the national ethos can be in
tension with each other. For example, the substantive value of democracy has been interpreted to
require an open-ended structure of public discourse that suspends all regulations of public discourse
that impose a particular conception of national identity, including regulations that express competing
constitutional ideals. See id at 272-76. There is thus always a potential conflict between the
implementation of the constitutional value of democracy and other constitutional values. This is
illustrated by the current debate over the regulation of hate speech, which is often cast as a conflict
between the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The example indicates that what traditional
constitutional theory conceptualizes as a tension between democracy and constitutionalism can
sometimes be seen more accurately as a conflict between the constitutional ideal of democracy and
other constitutional ideals.
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applications accumulate and acquire a life of their own, the institution of
judicial review has historically tended to transmute general or ambigu-
ous constitutional language into loci of national contestable ideals. This
is because we gravitate toward a vision of the rule of law that stresses
practices of justification, in the process rendering constitutional law
opaque to popular sovereignty."
The Court has used familiar techniques of education, persuasion,
argumentation, and inspiration to articulate constitutional ideals; it has
invoked the considerable prestige of its institutional authority; and it has
summoned the heavy presumption of traditional legal reasoning and
commitments. It has used these resources both to consolidate existing
cultural commitments and to facilitate the development of new cultural
commitments. In none of these situations, however, have the Court's
own constitutional interpretations exemplified the practice of demo-
cratic self-governance. They have instead demonstrated how the law can
evince and enforce ambient community norms.46 Whenever the law ex-
ercises this function in circumstances of cultural diversity, there is the
potential for hegemonic domination with respect to those who do not
share the cultural vision articulated by the law.47
In constitutional adjudication, this hegemony is sometimes a matter
of imposing constitutional ideals upon a dissenting geographical section
45. This suggests one reason why the tension between constitutionalism and democracy can
sometimes be so hard to grasp. Just as the term "democracy" can slide between the hard positivism of
popular sovereignty and the soft norm of democratic self-governance, so can the term
"constitutionalism" slip between the hard positivism of the law established by Article V and the soft
social idealism of the national ethos. In analyzing the tension between constitionalism and democracy,
one has to be very clear about the meanings of the terms being contrasted. To see how these different
meanings can change the significance of the opposition between democracy and constitutionalism,
imagine the following table:
Democracy versus Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism as Constitutionalism as
National Ethos (Normative) Positive Law
Democracy as 1 2
Normative Ideal
Democracy as 3 4
Popular Sovereignty
Questions at issue in Cell I will involve the conflict between the constitutional ideal of democracy and
other constitutional ideals, such as those discussed in footnote 44, supra. By contrast, questions in Cell
2 will focus on the relationship between positive constitutional requirements, as for example those of
Article V, and the ideal of democracy. In Cell 3 the tension between constitutionalism and democracy
will encompass routine issues of constitutional adjudication, in which constitutional norms, like the
ideal of democracy contained in the First Amendment, are pitted against majoritarian enactments.
Finally, issues in Cell 4 will revolve around matters of positive institutional design, as for example, the
relative advantages and disadvantages of majoritarianism and super-majoritarianism.
46. For other examples of this function of law, see PosT, supra note 20, at 51-116.
47. See id. at 3-4, 64-67, 89-116.
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of the nation, as happened in Brown v. Board of Education.48 Or this
hegemony can involve the attempt to impose generational (or perhaps
class) ideals on hostile segments of the population, as occurred during
the constitutional crisis of the New Deal. When the Court chooses to
press a particular vision of the national ethos in the face of opposition, it
is rendered vulnerable to political reprisal, which can take such various
forms as civil disobedience, hostile Presidential appointments, or con-
stitutional amendments. The difficulty and necessity of navigating
through such dangers is why it is said that Justices of the Supreme Court
must be "statesmen. 49
VII
Justice Brennan was a great judicial statesman. He was well aware of
the limits and obligations of his powerful position; he knew when and
where to compromise. But he was also, and most importantly, a su-
premely disciplined and forceful expositor of constitutional ideals, es-
pecially the ideal of democratic self-governance. Brennan's influence
on First Amendment jurisprudence is second to none. I agree entirely
with Michelman's assessment:
Brennan saw his Court as invested with authority and responsi-
bility to interpret for the country a procedure-independent stan-
dard of rightness, justice, and democracy for its political regime.
But it is enormously to his credit that he saw the Court as thus
empowered only as long as it exercised its power with a view to
protecting and expanding the rights and opportunities of every-
one to impress their views upon the Court and other social
authorities, democratically.10
Brennan's achievement, however, cannot be characterized as "self-
government through democracy." '51 Brennan expounded a convincing
account of the constitutional meaning of democracy, and he success-
fully translated much of that account into constitutional law. Although
those of us who share Brennan's perspective have reason to identify
with this law, the same can not be said of those who disagree with it. It is
certainly ironic that Brennan's constitutional judgments created free-
doms that enhance the democratic self-governance of all, even of those
who disagree with him about the meaning of democracy. Yet this irony
does not justify characterizing these judgments as themselves exempli-
fying the self-governance of those who dissent from them. The
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Court and Statesmanship, in LAW AND POLITics 34
(Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939).
50. Michelman, supra note 5, at 426.
51. Id.
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self-governance which these dissenters enjoy as a result of Brennan's
work is instead merely a reason that can be proffered to enlist their sup-
port of Brennan's constitutional vision.
That vision enjoys the status of a (legally) authoritative articulation
of national identity. As such, it forms part of an ongoing national proc-
ess of community self-definition,52 a process in which we are all impli-
cated and in which the contributions of constitutional theory can also
play some small role. All the more reason, then, to praise in this sympo-
sium the justness and profundity of Brennan's jurisprudence.
52. On the difference between democratic self-govemance and community self-definition, see
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 192-93 (1996).
1998]
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